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Shanor: Administrative Law -- The Supreme Court’s Impingement of Chevron’

CASE NOTE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—The Supreme Court’s Impingement of Chevron’s
Two-Step; Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009)
Marianne Kunz Shanor*

Introduction
The United States Supreme Court decision in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper,
Inc. not only continues to call into question the distinction between step one and
step two of the Chevron doctrine, but more importantly, it invigorates support
for a single-step Chevron inquiry.1 In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, the Supreme Court introduced a two-step doctrinal framework
for courts to apply in reviewing administrative agencies’ construction of statutes.2
First, a court must ascertain congressional intent on the specific issue.3 If Congress
addressed the specific issue, the analysis ends as both the agency and the court
must adhere to the clear intent of Congress.4 However, if a court finds statutory
ambiguity or silence, the court must evaluate the second step: whether the agency’s
construction of the statute is permissible.5
The Supreme Court invoked the two-step Chevron doctrine in Entergy
Corp. to determine whether § 316(b) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) authorized
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to use a cost-benefit analysis in
promulgating technology standards for cooling water intake structures.6 In a
disorderly fashion, the majority opinion addressed the second step of Chevron
prior to the first, observing, “But surely if Congress has directly spoken to an
issue then any agency interpretation contradicting what Congress has said
would be unreasonable.”7 Entergy Corp. exemplifies the elusive, inconsistent,
and unpredictable state of the Chevron doctrine.8 It is imperative the Supreme

* Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2011. I would like to thank my family,
professors, and the editors of the Wyoming Law Review for their support.
129 S. Ct. 1498, 1505–10 (2009); see Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule,
Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 Va. L. Rev. 597, 597 (2009) (arguing the two-step Chevron
doctrine should be collapsed into a single-step inquiry); infra notes 92–172 and accompanying text
(analyzing Entergy Corp. in conjunction with the Chevron doctrine).
1

2

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Id. at 843.

6

Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1505.

7

Id. at 1505 n.4.

8

See 1 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 3.6, at 175 (4th ed. 2002).
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Court explicitly collapse the two steps of the Chevron doctrine into a singlestep inquiry—“whether the agency’s construction is permissible as a matter of
statutory interpretation.”9
This case note will discuss Entergy Corp. in relation to the Chevron doctrine.10
The background section will first explore the CWA and then will outline the
Supreme Court decision Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.11 Second, the principal case section summarizes the reasoning behind the
opinions of the majority, the concurrence in part and dissent in part, and the
dissent in Entergy Corp.12 Finally, the analysis section argues the two-step Chevron
doctrine must be collapsed into a one-step doctrine.13

Background
Clean Water Act: § 316(b) Cooling Water Intake Structures
Pursuant to its authority under the Clean Water Act (CWA), the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgates rules to protect the
chemical, biological, and physical integrity of the nation’s waters.14 Section 316(b)
of the CWA mandates the EPA “require that the location, design, construction,
and capacity of cooling water intake structures reflect the best technology available
for minimizing adverse environmental impact.”15 Cooling water intake structures
draw water from a nearby source to cool a facility generating electricity or
engaging in other commercial processes.16 As the structures intake water, a serious

9

Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 599.

See infra notes 92–172 and accompanying text (examining the importance of Entergy Corp.
and the Chevron doctrine).
10

11

See infra notes 14–53 and accompanying text (discussing the CWA and Chevron).

See infra notes 54–91 and accompanying text (presenting the rationale behind the majority,
the in-part concurring and dissenting, and the dissenting opinions).
12

See infra notes 92–172 and accompanying text (analyzing Entergy Corp. in conjunction
with the Chevron doctrine).
13

14

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).

33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (1972) (emphasis added). The CWA includes other standards that
control the type of technology required to reduce pollutants from point sources. See Entergy Corp.
v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1506–07 (2009) (listing and discussing the other CWA
standards and the factors the agency may consider in promulgating regulations for those standards);
see also id. at 1511 (presenting in a table format the other CWA standards and the factors the agency
may consider in promulgation regulations). For a discussion of the other CWA standards and their
legislative history, see Patricia Ross McCubbin, The Risk in Technology Based Standards, 16 Duke
Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 1, 6–23 (2005).
15

Sara Gersen, Riverkeeper, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency: Applying
the Clean Water Act’s Best Technology Available Standard to Existing Cooling Systems, 35 Ecology L.Q.
269, 269–70 (2008). Water sources include lakes, rivers, streams, and other waterbodies. Id. at 269.
16
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threat to aquatic life occurs because organisms—fish, shellfish, eggs, larvae, and
plankton—may become impinged or entrained into the system.17
In 1995, the EPA promulgated new rules for § 316(b) of the CWA based
on different types of facilities and divided the facilities into three phases.18 In
establishing rules for Phase II facilities, the EPA conducted a cost-benefit analysis
to determine whether to require a closed-cycle recirculating cooling water
system.19 The EPA found the costs associated with retrofitting existing facilities
with this system outweighed its environmental benefits.20 Thus, the Phase II rule
promulgated by the EPA did not require Phase II facilities to install a closed-cycle
cooling water system.21 Section 316(b) of the CWA does not list any factors,
including costs or benefits, the EPA may consider in establishing the standard;
§ 316(b) merely requires the best technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact.22 Consequently, a statutory interpretation issue arose as to
whether the EPA may permissibly include a cost-benefit analysis in promulgating
rules for § 316(b) of the CWA.23

17
Reda M. Dennis-Parks, Riverkeeper, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency: Finally a Solution the Court Can Live With . . . Almost, 32 Ecology L.Q. 689, 691 (2005).
Impingement occurs when aquatic life becomes squashed against the intake screens. Entergy Corp.,
129 S. Ct. at 1502. Entrainment of the aquatic life happens when the system suctions organisms
into the system. Id.

Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1503. Phase I regulates all new facilities and requires
those facilities to build a closed-cycle recirculating cooling water system that extracts less water
and therefore causes less harm to the aquatic life. Id. Phase III standards apply to new offshore
oil and gas extraction and other existing facilities, which the EPA manages on a case-by-case
basis. Environmental Protection Agency, Fact Sheet Phase III Final Rule, http://www.epa.gov/
waterscience/316b/phase3/ph3-final-fs.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
18

Environmental Protection Agency, Economic and Benefits Analysis for the Final § 316(b)
Phase II Existing Facilities Rule (Feb. 2004), http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/316b/phase2/
econbenefits/final.htm; see also Gersen, supra note 16, at 271–72.
19

Environmental Protection Agency, Economic and Benefits Analysis for the Final
§ 316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, D1-3, Table D1-3 (Feb. 2004), http://www.epa.gov/
waterscience/316b/phase2/econbenefits/final/d1.pdf.
20

21

Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1504.

Id. at 1511. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006) (listing no factors for the EPA to consider
in promulgating the regulations), with id. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (listing multiple factors the EPA must
consider in implementing regulations, including the cost of the technology in comparison with
the benefits of the effluent reduction), id. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (listing multiple factors the EPA must
consider in promulgating regulations, including the “reasonableness of the relationship” between the
costs and the benefits of the effluent reduction), and id. § 1314(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B) (listing multiple
factors the EPA must consider in implementing regulations including the costs of achieving the
effluent reduction).
22

23

See Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1505–11.
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The Chevron Two-Step
Prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Court reviewed an agency’s
interpretation of a statute either by applying a reasonableness test or, in some
cases, applying the Court’s own interpretation.24 When applying either approach,
the Court failed to articulate reasoning for why one approach should apply and the
other should not.25 Criticisms by lower courts and scholars for failure to sustain
consistency or make clear the reasoning behind these inconsistent judgments
plagued the Court during the pre-Chevron era.26
In its 1984 decision, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., the United States Supreme Court abandoned its prior approaches
and developed the two-step doctrine that continues to dominate judicial review
of agencies’ interpretation of statutes.27 The issue in Chevron involved the EPA’s
interpretation of the term “stationary source” in the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1977.28 The EPA argued “stationary source” included all pollution emitting
devices within a plant.29 In effect, the EPA embraced the “bubble concept,”
which allowed an existing plant to alter or add a pollution-emitting device if total
emissions from the plant did not increase.30
On appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, the United States Supreme Court outlined a two-step process for
courts to use when evaluating agencies’ interpretation of statutes.31 First, the court
must look to the statute and determine whether the statutory provision at issue
is in fact ambiguous.32 If Congressional intent is clear, the court and agency must
24
Pierce, supra note 8, § 3.1, at 137; see also, e.g., Sanford N. Caust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks:
Restoring the Balance of Powers in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. Rev. 757, 764–70 (discussing
the Hearst Publications and Packard Motor Car Co. cases as pre-Chevron decisions). Compare Nat’l
Labor Relations Bd. v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) (applying a reasonableness test
and upholding the National Labor Relation Board’s interpretation of the term “employee”), with
Packard Motor Car Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 485, 488–90 (1947) (applying
its own interpretation of the term “employee” and overturning the National Labor Relation
Board’s interpretation).
25

Pierce, supra note 8, § 3.1, at 137.

Id. at 137–38; see also Denise W. DeFranco, Chevron and Canons of Statutory Construction,
58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 829, 834–37 (1990) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s different
approaches to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes prior to the Chevron decision).
26

27
467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984); see Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187,
188 (2006) (discussing the influence of Chevron and its “quasi-constitutional text”).
28

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840–41.

29

Id. at 840.

30

Id.

31

Id. at 842–43.

32

Id. at 842.
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follow the unambiguously expressed intent.33 Second, if the statutory language is
ambiguous or silent, then the court must determine if the agency’s interpretation is
a permissible construction.34 If the agency’s interpretation is permissible, Chevron
demands deference to the agency.35
In addressing the first step, whether Congress has directly spoken to the issue,
courts may invoke “traditional tools of statutory construction.”36 Yet, Chevron
does not prescribe what constitutes a traditional tool of statutory construction.37
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has used various approaches for
determining if ambiguity exists.38 First, the Court may employ a plain meaning
approach.39 Second, the Court may consider the statutory text and structure,
legislative history and intent, and canons of construction.40 As a result, confusion
exists as to how to determine ambiguity at Chevron’s step one.41 Nevertheless, if a
court finds Congress did not specifically address the issue, the court proceeds to
the second step.42
The second step of the Chevron doctrine seeks to ascertain the permissibility of
the agency’s construction of the ambiguous or silent statute.43 The Supreme Court
did not specifically state the criteria to determine permissibility.44 However, the

33

Id. at 842–43.

34

Id. at 843.

35

Id. at 844.

36

Id. at 843 n.9.

37

See id.

William F. Funk, Sidney A. Shapiro & Russell L. Weaver, Administrative Procedure
Practice 149 (3d ed. 2006).
38

and

Id.; e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1178 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Household Credit Servs. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 239–40 (2004); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417–18 (1992) (applying plain-meaning approach).
39

A Guide To Judicial and Political Review of Federal Agencies 57 (John F. Duffy &
Michael Herz eds., 2005) [hereinafter Guide]; e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540
U.S. 581, 600 (2004) (noting the “text, structure, purpose and history” indicated no ambiguity
of the term “age” under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985) (determining reasonableness by considering the
statute’s language, history, and policies); see also DeFranco, supra note 26, at 841 (stating canons
of construction, the purpose of the statute, conflicting policy considerations, and legislative intent
should be evaluated). But see Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,
72 Wash. U. L.Q. 351, 355–57 (1994) (discussing the use of legislative history by the Supreme
Court in applying the Chevron doctrine). There are also other construction maxims not listed in this
article. See Guide, supra, at 57.
40

41

Funk, Shapiro & Weaver, supra note 38, at 149–52.

42

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.

43

Id. at 843.

See id. at 845. However, the Court certainly suggested deference is appropriate since the
administrative agency is the expert. Id. at 844.
44
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Court noted the reviewing court does not need to find the agency’s interpretation
as the only permissible one, or even the interpretation the court would reach
itself.45 The Court further explained that ambiguity within a statute may be either
explicit or implicit.46 Explicit ambiguity indicates Congress expressly granted
agencies authority to implement a regulation.47 Courts must grant deference
to agencies regulating an explicit ambiguity, unless the regulation is “arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”48 If the statute contains implicit
authority, a reasonable interpretation by an agency controls and a court may
not substitute its own interpretation.49 If a court finds the agency’s construction
permissible, it must grant deference.50
The underlying policies behind the ruling in Chevron included agency
expertise, political accountability, and congressional intent.51 Chevron commenced
a new era of courts’ evaluations of ambiguous statutes interpreted by administrative
agencies.52 The Chevron era continues to evolve and erode as courts apply the
doctrine, as evidenced in Entergy Corp.53

Principal Case
In Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., the United States Supreme Court
considered whether the EPA may utilize a cost-benefit analysis in promulgating
rules for § 316(b) of the CWA.54 The EPA’s rule excluded Phase II facilities from
the requirement of a closed-cycle cooling water system.55 The Court held the EPA
45

Id. at 843 n.11.

Id. at 843–44. Contra Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy
to Senescence, 59 Admin. L. Rev. 725, 779–80 (2007) (arguing the implicit delegation in Chevron
has been limited by the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions).
46

47

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.

48

Id. at 844.

49

Id.

50

Id.

David M. Gossett, Comment, Chevron, Take Two: Deference to Revised Agency Interpretations
of Statutes, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681, 688–89 (1997). But see Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed
Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42
Conn. L. Rev. 779, 795–809 (2010) (arguing the purposes behind Chevron are not adequate); Cass
R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071, 2074–75 (1990)
(calling Chevron a counter-Marbury).
51

52

Gossett, supra note 51, at 688.

See generally Jellum, supra note 46, at 743–81 (surveying Supreme Court cases at step one
of the Chevron doctrine); Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Construction and Application of
“Chevron Deference” to Administrative Action by United States Supreme Court, 3 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 25
(2005) (providing a summary of Supreme Court cases applying the Chevron doctrine).
53

54

Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1505 (2009).

Id. at 1504; see supra notes 18–23 and accompanying text (explaining the Phase II
regulation).
55
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permissibly interpreted § 316(b) to allow for the use of a cost-benefit analysis
under the second step of the Chevron doctrine.56

Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito.57 The majority initially recognized that
the EPA determined § 316(b) of the CWA permitted the comparison of costs and
benefits, and noted that the EPA’s interpretation would be granted deference if it
was a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute.58 In applying the Chevron
doctrine, the majority addressed the second prong of reasonableness without
first considering whether § 316(b) of the CWA was ambiguous.59 The dissent
criticized the majority for failing to consider the first step prior to considering the
second step.60 In response, the majority stated, “But surely if Congress has directly
spoken to an issue then any agency interpretation contradicting what Congress
has said would be unreasonable.”61
To determine the permissibility of the EPA’s interpretation, the majority next
considered the text of § 316(b).62 Section 316(b), in relevant part, provides “any
standard established . . . shall require that the location, design, construction, and
capacity of cooling water intake structures reflect the best technology available for
minimizing adverse environmental impact.”63 The Court looked to the meaning of
the words “best” and “minimizing.”64 The majority determined the meaning of
“best” included efficient technology with the lowest cost per unit of reduction.65
The majority also found Congress had intended to use the word “minimizing”
as a term of degree and not necessarily as meaning the smallest amount.66
Furthermore, the Court stated that other provisions of the CWA, which mandated
the smallest amount of environmental impact, used words such as “elimination”

56

Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1510.

57

Id. at 1501.

58

Id. at 1505.

59

See id. at 1505–10.

60

Id. at 1518 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

61

Id. at 1505 n.4 (majority opinion).

62

Id. at 1505.

63

33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006) (emphasis added).

64

Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1505–06.

65

Id. at 1506.

Id. The Court cited another provision in the CWA as an example. Id. The provision states
“drastic minimization of paperwork and interagency decision procedures.” Id. The Court noted
if “minimize” means the smallest amount possible as respondents alleged, then “drastic” becomes
superfluous. Id.
66
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and “no discharge of pollutants.”67 Therefore, the Court concluded the text of
§ 316(b) did not exclude the comparison of costs and benefits, which evidenced
the reasonableness of the EPA’s interpretation.68
The majority next compared § 316(b) of the CWA with other CWA
standards for controlling point sources to determine the reasonableness of the
EPA’s interpretation.69 The CWA provides factors for the EPA to consider in
promulgating rules for the other standards, but does not provide any factors
for § 316(b).70 The majority concluded the congressional silence in § 316(b)
permitted comparison of the costs and benefits.71 Otherwise, if the EPA could
not consider costs and benefits, it could not consider any other relevant factors,
which is completely illogical.72 As a result, the majority found the silence in
§ 316(b) indicated the reasonableness of the EPA’s interpretation.73
The majority also addressed the EPA’s actions interpreting and implementing
§ 316(b) of the CWA over the past thirty years, which allowed for the comparison
of costs and benefits.74 The majority further stated that even the environmental
groups, states, and power utilities realized some form of cost-benefit analysis is
necessary in the implementation of the standard.75 For all of the previously stated
reasons, the majority held the EPA permissibly relied on a cost-benefit analysis in
promulgating § 316(b) under step two of the Chevron doctrine.76

Justice Breyer: Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part
Justice Breyer agreed with the majority that the EPA’s interpretation of
§ 316(b) was permissible under Chevron step two.77 Justice Breyer considered the
legislative history of the various CWA standards, and concluded § 316(b) neither
67

Id.

68

Id.

Id. at 1506–08 (demarcating the other CWA standards and conducting a comparison of
the other CWA standards and § 316(b)).
69

Id. at 1507 (outlining factors the EPA must consider in promulgating regulations for the
other CWA standards and stating Congress did not list any factors for the EPA to consider in
implementing § 316(b)).
70

71

Id. at 1508.

72

Id.

73

Id.

Id. at 1509. The majority referred to several cases including Alaska Department of
Environmental Conservation v. E.P.A., 540 U.S. 461, 487 (2004), and Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S.
212, 219–20 (2002).
74

75
Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1510. The environmental groups, states, and power utilities
observed the statute did not mandate the EPA to force the industry to protect one fish for billions
of dollars. Id.
76

Id.

77

Id. at 1515 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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requires nor forbids the use of comparison of costs and benefits.78 However,
he determined Congress intended to restrict the EPA’s use of the analysis to a
standard of “reasonable” under the circumstances.79
Justice Breyer ultimately dissented from the majority’s holding because he
believed the case should be remanded to the EPA for consideration of its permit
variance under the rules for § 316(b).80 Under the rules, a facility may be granted
a permit variance if it can show the costs of installation are “significantly greater
than” the benefits.81 The EPA’s prior standard required a showing of costs “wholly
disproportionate” to the benefits.82 Since Justice Breyer did not think the EPA
adequately explained the new standard, he would remand for it to do so or apply
the “wholly disproportionate” standard.83

Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, issued a dissenting
opinion.84 The dissent argued that Congress intended to prohibit the EPA’s
use of a cost-benefit analysis in promulgating § 316(b) of the CWA.85 Justice
Stevens criticized the use of a cost-benefit analysis because it typically finds the
costs outweigh the environmental benefits.86 For this reason, the dissent argued
that Congress clearly indicates when the EPA is permitted to utilize the costbenefit method.87
The dissent next addressed the CWA standards and legislative history.88 The
dissent argued Congress specified in the other CWA standards whether the EPA
was permitted to use a cost-benefit analysis and § 316(b)’s silence indicated the
EPA may not use a cost-benefit analysis.89 The dissent also found it “puzzling”
78

Id. at 1512–13.

Id. A standard of “reasonableness” includes not necessarily a full drawn cost-benefit analysis,
but one which does take into consideration the costs of a decision. Id. at 1514–15.
79

80

Id. at 1515.

81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Id. at 1515–16.

84

Id. at 1516 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

85

Id.

86

Id. at 1516–17.

Id. The Court relied on Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 467–69
(2001) (finding that the EPA could not use cost-benefit analysis in implementing a Clean Air Act
regulation for a section that was silent on the matter, where other sections gave the EPA authority
to consider costs). Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1517–18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87

88
Id. at 1518–22; see id. at 1511 (majority opinion) (providing a table listing the other
CWA standards).
89

Id. at 1518–22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the majority skipped the first step of Chevron and proceeded to the second step.90
Consequently, the dissent found § 316(b) unambiguous under step one of the
Chevron doctrine and that the EPA therefore acted impermissibly.91

Analysis
The United States Supreme Court should explicitly collapse the two-step
Chevron doctrine into a single-step inquiry: “whether the agency’s construction
is permissible as a matter of statutory interpretation.”92 In Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper, Inc., the Supreme Court held the EPA’s use of a cost-benefit analysis
permissible under § 316(b) of the CWA.93 However, in reaching this conclusion,
the Court furthered the uncertainty that has emerged in applying the two steps of
the Chevron doctrine to agencies’ interpretation of statutes.94
The majority’s analysis in Entergy Corp. began with step two of the Chevron
doctrine by asking whether the EPA’s interpretation of § 316(b) of the CWA
was permissible.95 This appears mismatched with the traditional Chevron twostep.96 The root of this issue is captured by the banter between the majority
and the dissent; the dissent was “puzzled” by the majority, which addressed
the second step of the Chevron doctrine prior to the first step.97 Justice Scalia’s
poignant response noted, “But surely if Congress has directly spoken to an issue
then any agency interpretation contradicting what Congress has said would be
unreasonable.”98

90

Id. at 1518 n.5.

91

See id. at 1520–21.

92

Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 599.

93

Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1510.

See infra notes 146–53 and accompanying text (discussing the inconsistency of the Supreme
Court’s application of the Chevron doctrine).
94

95
See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1505 (2009). The Court stated the
EPA’s construction of § 316(b) of the CWA—allowing a comparison of the costs associated with
the technology in relation to the environmental benefits—governed, so long as it is a reasonable
interpretation, not even the only interpretation or the one the court would choose. Id. Section
316(b) of the CWA mandates the EPA to “require that the location, design, construction, and
capacity of cooling water intake structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse
environmental impact.” 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (1972) (emphasis added).
96
Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1518 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (providing step one, then step two).
97

Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 1518 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Id. at 1505 n.4 (majority opinion); see also supra notes 57–76 and accompanying text
(discussing the majority’s analysis).
98
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Two-Step or One-Step?
As a practical matter, the Chevron doctrine contains only one single step,
not two.99 When scrutinized closely, Chevron’s two steps beg the same question:
“whether the agency’s construction is permissible as a matter of statutory
interpretation.”100 Courts’ applications of the Chevron doctrine demonstrate the
redundancy of the two-step analysis and the necessity to consolidate the doctrine
into a single-step inquiry.101

Step One Applied
In a court’s application of step one, the analysis of step two becomes
unavoidably intermingled.102 The underlying purpose behind step one is to
determine whether ambiguity exists in the statutory language.103 The language
within statutes usually contains ambiguity, although it may vary in degree.104
No precise method of analysis to determine ambiguity exists under step one.105
Therefore, courts generally look to traditional tools of statutory construction,
such as the plain meaning of the text, dictionaries, and the statute’s structure,
99
Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 597–98 (arguing Chevron’s two-step analysis
should be combined into a single inquiry); see Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative
Interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 Admin. L.J. 255, 256 n.10 (1988)
(noting Chevron’s two steps could be conflated into one, because “if the intent of Congress is clear,
a nonconforming interpretation would necessarily be unreasonable”); Gary Lawson, Outcome,
Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for Legal Conclusions, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 313,
344 n.5 (1996) (stating the Chevron test may be combined into a single step with the same results as
application of the two-step test); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered,
72 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 1253, 1284 (1997) (suggesting if the issue is whether an agency decision
conflicts with an unambiguous statute, the court should not use two steps, but a unified inquiry at
step one); see also Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory
Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 767, 809
(2008) (citing examples of cases combining the Chevron doctrine into a single step); Orin S. Kerr,
Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Court of Appeals,
15 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 30 (1998) (finding in 1995 and 1996, all of the U.S. Courts of Appeals
opinions applying the Chevron doctrine combined the two steps into a single step twenty-eight
percent of the time).
100

Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 599; accord Lawson, supra note 99, at 314 n.5.

See infra notes 102–64 and accompanying text (discussing applications of the Chevron
doctrine by the Supreme Court and courts of appeals).
101

102

See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 599–600.

Pierce, supra note 8, § 3.6, at 169 (“A court’s task in applying step one is to
determine the existence, or nonexistence, of ambiguity in the relevant language of an agencyadministered statute.”).
103

Id. § 3.1, at 137; see, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1171 (2009) (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding the majority of statutes have a degree
of ambiguity).
104

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)
(directing courts to use “traditional tools of statutory construction” to determine Congress’s intent,
but failing to define “traditional tools of statutory construction”).
105

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2010

11

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 10 [2010], No. 2, Art. 8

548	Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 10

history, and purpose.106 By employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
the court will find a range of statutory meanings intended by Congress.107 The
range of statutory meanings includes statutory interpretations that the court would
consider reasonable, and also includes the court’s preferred interpretation.108 The
court will then determine if the statute is ambiguous by considering whether
the agency’s interpretation falls within this range, which is step two of the
analysis—whether the agency’s construction of the statute is permissible.109 If
the court finds the agency’s construction within the range, it must uphold the
agency’s interpretation.110 But if the court finds the agency’s interpretation outside
the range, then the agency’s interpretation conflicts with the clearly expressed
Congressional intent.111 Consequently, a court cannot decide step one without
utilizing the analysis of step two.112
Many of the Supreme Court’s opinions exemplify the redundancy of the
Chevron doctrine at step one.113 For example, in MCI Telecommunications Corp.
v. AT&T, the Court decided the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
106
See supra notes 36–42 and accompanying text (discussing the various methods courts
employ to analyze step one).
107
Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 601 (discussing the range of permissible
interpretations determined by the court, which the statute allows). “Chevron supposes that
interpretation is an exercise in identifying the statute’s range of reasonable interpretations,” not
finding only one single meaning. Id.; see also Beermann, supra note 51, at 817–18 (noting in
Chevron, the Court did not adhere to the “directly spoken to” language of Chevron’s first step,
indicating there is not only one single meaning).
108
Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 601 (discussing the range of permissible
interpretations determined by the court, which the statute allows); see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843
n.11 (finding the agency’s construction does not have to be the only permissible construction or
even the construction the court would reach).

Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 601 (noting the court must uphold the agency’s
construction if it is within the range of permissible interpretations); Pierce, supra note 8, § 3.6, at
169 (“The question for the court [at step one] is whether the agency’s construction of the language is
within the range of meanings that could be plausibly attributed to the relevant statutory language.”);
see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (providing the second step of the Chevron doctrine).
109

110

Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 601.

Id. If the agency’s interpretation falls outside of the range, it may also be considered a
step-two decision. Id. at 601. The court could find ambiguity within the statute and then rule the
agency’s interpretation falls outside the range, therefore making it an impermissible interpretation.
Id. at 601–02; see infra notes 126–43 and accompanying text (discussing the redundancy of the
Chevron doctrine at step two).
111

112

Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 599–602.

Compare Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
132–33 (2000) (decided at step one), Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co.,
522 U.S. 479, 499–500 (1998) (same), Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 482–83 (1990) (same),
and Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986)
(same), with Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 484–85 (2001) (decided at step
two), and AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 392 (1999) (same). Confusion exists as
to whether Whitman is a decision decided at step one or step two. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, A Guide to
Federal Agency Rulemaking 499 n.123 (4th ed. 2006).
113
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exceeded its authority by deciding all nondominant long distance carriers may
optionally file tariffs.114 The issue involved the ambiguity of the term “modify”
under the Telecommunications Act, which grants the FCC the ability to “modify”
the requirements of the Act.115 The FCC argued the term “modify” included “a
basic or important change in,” citing only Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary.116 The FCC concluded its decision to allow the nondominant long
distance carriers to optionally file tariffs only “modified” the requirements.117 The
Court looked to numerous dictionaries to find the term “modify” unambiguous
with one single meaning—a “moderate change.”118 However, in determining this
lack of ambiguity, the Court compared the FCC’s interpretation of “modify”—“a
basic or important change in”—with the other dictionary definitions.119 As a
result, the Court blended the two steps by determining the ambiguity of the
term “modify” (step one) by using the FCC’s interpretation (part of step two’s
reasonableness analysis).120
The Supreme Court also decided Immigration & Naturalization Service v.
Cardoza-Fonseca at step one of the Chevron doctrine.121 Under the Immigration
and Nationality Act, the Attorney General may grant asylum under § 243(h)
if “it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution,”
or under § 208(a) if the alien has a “well-founded fear” of persecution.122 The
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in litigation held § 243(h) and
§ 208(a) required the same standard of proof—more likely than not.123 The
Supreme Court considered the plain meaning of the statutory language, found it
did not contain ambiguity, and concluded the INS’s interpretation of the statute
failed to meet step one of Chevron.124 Certainly, the decision can also be deemed
a step-two reversal, because the Supreme Court could have found ambiguity and
decided the INS’s interpretation of § 243(h) and § 208(a) was an impermissible interpretation.125
512 U.S. 218, 234 (1994); see Beermann, supra note 51, at 820 (discussing MCI as an
example of the plain meaning approach).
114

115

MCI, 512 U.S. at 225.

116

Id. at 225–26.

117

Id.

118

Id. at 227–28.

119

Id. at 224–28.

120

See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 599–600.

121

480 U.S. 421, 430–32 (1987).

122

Id. at 423.

123

Id. at 425.

Id. at 446–49. The Supreme Court noted § 208(a) allows for a subjective component,
while § 243(h) only allows for an objective component. Id. at 431.
124

125
Pierce, supra note 8, § 3.6, at 170 (noting the Court’s decision in Cardoza-Fonseca could
be considered a Chevron step-two reversal because the INS’s interpretation was not a permissible
construction of the statute).
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Step Two Applied
Application of step two by courts further demonstrates the superfluity of
the two steps.126 In applying step two, the agency’s construction of the statute
will be deemed impermissible if it clearly conflicts with the statute that has been
determined in step one to be ambiguous on the matter at issue.127 The court
will compare the agency’s interpretation with the statutory text to find whether
the agency’s interpretation deserves deference.128 As a result, a court only applies
step two by employing step one.129 Therefore, Justice Scalia’s footnote correctly
noted if the agency’s interpretation conflicts with Congressional intent, it must be
deemed unreasonable.130
Entergy Corp. exemplifies the fact that applying step two inherently incorporates
step one.131 The majority held the EPA’s decision to use a cost-benefit analysis for
§ 316(b) permissible under step two of the Chevron doctrine.132 However, imagine
if the Court found the EPA’s interpretation unreasonable or impermissible. The
Court would compare the agency’s interpretation with Congressional intent and
find that the agency’s interpretation is excluded by Congressional intent and
is therefore impermissible.133 In effect, this finding would show Congress did
actually speak to and possess intentions regarding the precise issue at hand.134

Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 600; see infra notes 127– 43 and accompanying
text (demonstrating the redundancy of step two with step one).
126

Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 600; see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984).
127

Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 600; e.g., Holly Farms Corp. v. Nat’l Labor
Relations Bd., 517 U.S. 392, 401–05 (1996) (evaluating the agency’s interpretation with the statutory
language “on the farm” to determine whether the agency’s interpretation was reasonable); Babbitt
v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697–703 (1995) (comparing
generally the agency’s interpretation with the Endangered Species Act); Good Samaritan Hosp.
v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 414–20 (1993) (assessing the reasonableness of the agency’s decision by
comparing the agency’s interpretation with the statutory language).
128

129

Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 600.

130

See id. at 597–98.

131

See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1505–08 (2009).

132

Id. at 1510.

See Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 599–600. In discussing Chevron, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted, “[T]here must be two or more
reasonable ways to interpret the statute, and the regulation must adopt one of those ways. Those two
requirements are obviously intertwined.” Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist.,
570 F.3d 1210, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009).
133

Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 600; see also Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a
Great Or. v. Babbitt, 30 F.3d 190, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding step one requires traditional tools
of statutory construction, which are also pertinent to step two, concluding the exact point where
an agency decision may be invalidated is unclear and noting that the Chevron Court never specified
which step it was applying).
134
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Instead, the Court could find Congress did speak to the issue and consequently
hold the agency’s construction inconsistent with step one rather than invalidate
the construction at step two.135
Illustrating this principle, in 1999 the United States Supreme Court for
the first time found an agency’s interpretation impermissible under step two
in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board.136 The FCC promulgated an order under the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 requiring incumbent local exchange carriers
to open a minimum of seven of their network elements to other carriers.137 The
Supreme Court found the FCC’s order neglected to consider several of the statute’s
requirements.138 First, the FCC did not consider whether it was “necessary” for
the other carriers to access the incumbent carriers’ networks.139 Second, the FCC
failed to consider whether the other carriers would be “impaired” from entering
the market without access to the incumbent carriers’ networks.140 Consequently,
the Supreme Court found the FCC’s interpretation of the statute unreasonable,
but did not cite Chevron.141 The Court could have determined no ambiguity
existed within the statutory language and the FCC failed to follow unambiguous
congressional intent, thus deciding the case at step one.142 Decisions rendered
at the second step of Chevron exemplify that the two steps really beg the
same question.143

Importance of the One-Step Analysis
Explicit standards for evaluating either step one or step two of the Chevron
doctrine do not exist. For step one, Chevron urges courts to use traditional tools of
statutory construction, but does not delineate the types of devices that constitute

135

Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 600.

136

525 U.S. 366, 392 (1999).

137

Id. at 387–88. The provision of the Telecommunication Act at issue in AT&T Corp. states:
In determining what network elements should be made available for purposes of
subsection (c)(3) of this section, the Commission shall consider, at a minimum,
whether—(A) access to such network elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary;
and (B) the failure to provide access to such network elements would impair the
ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services that it
seeks to offer.

47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
138

AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 387–88.

139

Id. at 388–92.

140

Id.

Id. at 392. The Court does employ language similar to Chevron step two and many
commentators consider this a step-two decision. Guide, supra note 40, at 89 n.138.
141

142

Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 601.

143

Id. at 600.
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traditional tools of statutory construction.144 More importantly, the Court does
not specifically articulate a standard of permissibility—what is and is not a
permissible construction of the ambiguous statute—for step two.145
The United States Supreme Court continually uses inconsistent and elusive
applications of the Chevron doctrine in reviewing cases of statutory interpretation
by agencies.146 The Court applies the Chevron doctrine with varying force and at
times ignores the doctrine completely.147 Additionally, the Court describes the
Chevron doctrine in different and conflicting manners.148
Generally, courts focus on step one of the inquiry and seldom invalidate the
agency’s interpretation on step two.149 In particular, the Supreme Court only
144

Guide, supra note 40, at 57.

Levin, supra note 99, at 1260. Chevron distinguishes between express delegation of authority
given to an administrative agency by Congress and interpretative authority not expressly given by
Congress. 88 C.J.S. Pub. Admin. Law & Procedure § 220 (2009). Courts review express delegation
of authority to an agency under the standard of arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute. Id.; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. Interpretative or implicit authority is at issue in
this case note, while express delegation of authority is not.
145

Pierce, supra note 8, § 3.6, at 175–89; Levin, supra note 99, at 1260; e.g., United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (noting Chevron deference is appropriate when Congress
granted an agency the power to make a rule carrying the force of law); see Czarnezki, supra note 99,
at 774–76. Compare Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 42–43 (1990) (refusing to
grant Chevron deference), with id. at 43–47 (White, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority
and applying Chevron deference); compare Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354,
380–83 (1988) (applying the Chevron framework and granting deference), with id. at 386–90
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (declining to apply the Chevron doctrine). But see Smiley v. Citibank, 517
U.S. 735, 739–45 (1996) (granting deference under Chevron by all Justices).
146

Pierce, supra note 8, § 3.6, at 175–89; e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Serv. v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982–83 (2005) (holding only precedent clearly precluding the
agency’s interpretation will prevent deference); Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
531 U.S. 159, 172–73 (2001) (citing constitutional issues as the reason for not applying Chevron
deference); Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 134–35 (1990) (finding
previous Supreme Court precedent overrides the Chevron doctrine); see Sunstein, supra note 27, at
191 (noting the initial inquiry of whether the Chevron doctrine applies is “Chevron step zero”). See
generally Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 980–85
(1992) (surveying Supreme Court cases involving a question of deference).
147

Pierce, supra note 8, § 3.6, at 175–89; see Beermann, supra note 51, at 817–22 (discussing
the different approaches the Court applies at step one); see also supra notes 36–42 and accompanying
text (addressing the various approaches the Supreme Court has used on step one of the Chevron
doctrine). Compare Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984) (finding the first step of the Chevron analysis is “whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue”), with K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291–92 (1988) (stating
first step of the Chevron doctrine uses the plain meaning of the statute) and Nat’l Credit Union
Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 501–02 (1998) (applying the “canon of
construction that similar language contained within the same section of a statute must be accorded
a consistent meaning” in determining ambiguity under step one).
148

149
Czarnezki, supra note 99, at 775; Lawson, supra note 99, at 314; see, e.g., United States
v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 299 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding the term “persecution” unambiguous at step
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twice invalidated an agency’s construction of a statute relying solely on step two
of the doctrine.150 Since step one inherently involves step two, the practicality and
efficacy of applying step two as its own independent step becomes questionable.151
In addition, if the Supreme Court continues to make critical decisions relying
solely on step one, many will believe the case is over when the Court finishes the
analysis of step one.152 Often courts’ opinions decided at step one may be written
as step-two opinions.153
The Supreme Court’s failure to provide guidelines for step two of the
Chevron doctrine has caused not only tremendous inconsistency within its
own jurisprudence, but also for the lower courts applying the doctrine.154 Two
approaches dominate the second step analysis in the lower courts, as no established
criteria for permissibility exist.155 First, some courts find an agency’s interpretation
one); Becker v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 230 F.3d 381, 390–97 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971 ambiguous on whether it covers corporate donations to nonpartisan
debates, but concluding the agency’s interpretation was permissible); Mosquera-Perez v. I.N.S., 3
F.3d 553, 555–59 (1st Cir. 1993) (focusing on step one and determining § 1253(h)(2)(B) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act as ambiguous, but finding the agency’s interpretation was not
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious); CSX Transp. v. United States, 867 F.2d 1439, 1442–44
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (applying step one and concluding “any rate” is unambiguous); Wyo. Farm Bureau
Fed’n v. Babbitt, 987 F. Supp. 1349, 1371–72 (D. Wyo. 1997) (finding ambiguity in the term
“population” under step one and finding the agency’s interpretation as permissible under step two).
150
Czarnezki, supra note 99, at 775. The two Supreme Court opinions are Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 485 (2001), and AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525
U.S. 366, 392 (1999). Czarnezki, supra note 99, at 775 n.35. Prior to 1997, the Court had never
solely used step two to invalidate an action. Levin, supra note 99, at 1261.

Levin, supra note 99, at 1262 (questioning whether step two of the Chevron doctrine
“serves any useful purpose”).
151

Id. (stating litigants and lower courts may believe if the Court moves to step two they are
“home free”). Courts have applied Chevron well over one hundred times. Pierce, supra note 8, § 3.6,
at 168. Only two cases have been decided solely at step two. See Lubbers, supra note 113, at 499
n.123. As a result, two out of one hundred provides a two percent chance of being overturned solely
at step two.
152

153
Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 600; Levin, supra note 99, at 1282–83; see supra
notes 118–30 and accompanying text (discussing the MCI and Cardoza-Fonseca step-one opinions
and how the Supreme Court could have decided them at step two); e.g., Saysana v. Gillen, 590 F.3d
7, 13–18 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding statutory language unambiguous at step one, but continuing the
analysis and concluding even if the language were ambiguous, the agency’s interpretation would be
unreasonable at step two).
154
See Lawson, supra note 99, at 342. Compare Stiver v. Meko, 130 F.3d 574, 577 (3d Cir.
1997) (noting the distinction between implicit and explicit statutory gaps, finding the agency’s
interpretation as a reasonable accommodation, and thus permissible), with Northpoint Tech., Ltd.
v. F.C.C., 412 F.3d 145, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating a permissible construction of a statute uses
the same analysis as the arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute standard). See
infra notes 154–64 and accompanying text (discussing the various approaches circuit courts of
appeals apply at step two).

Guide, supra note 40, at 86; Ronald M. Levin, A Blackletter Statement of Federal
Administrative Law, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 38 (2002).
155
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permissible if it is reasonable and may also consider whether the interpretation
harmonizes with the statute’s plain language, purpose, and origin.156 Second,
other courts will only find an agency’s interpretation of a statute impermissible if
it is not arbitrary or capricious.157
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA demonstrates the division
among the lower courts on the approach to determine permissibility under step
two of the Chevron doctrine.158 In that case, the EPA promulgated a rule for
storm-water discharges, excluding the requirement of obtaining a permit for
certain discharges of sediments.159 The majority opinion noted the failure of the
EPA to follow its previous decisions in the area.160 Consequently, the court found
the EPA’s new rule arbitrary and capricious under the second step of Chevron.161
The dissent criticized the majority for relying on the EPA’s prior approach and
instead applied a reasoned analysis test.162 The dissent argued the EPA gave a
reasoned explanation for the change in its ruling and therefore satisfied the second

156
88 C.J.S. Pub. Admin. Law & Procedure § 220 (2009); e.g., Pac. Nw. Generating Coop. v.
Dep’t of Energy, 580 F.3d 792, 806 (9th Cir. 2009) (determining a reviewing court owes deference
to a reasonable agency interpretation filling an implicit statutory gap left by Congress); Fort Hood
Barbers Ass’n v. Herman, 137 F.3d 302, 308 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding an agency’s interpretation
permissible if not irrational and reasonably related to the statutory purpose).
157
88 C.J.S. Pub. Admin. Law & Procedure § 220; e.g., Riverkeeper, Inc. v. E.P.A., 358 F.3d
174, 184 (2d Cir. 2004) (determining an agency’s construction of a statute is impermissible under
the second step of Chevron if it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”); N.Y.
Pub. Interest Research Group v. Whitman, 321 F.3d 316, 324 (2d Cir. 2003) (asserting when the
question is about the reasonableness of an agency’s action, the arbitrary and capricious standard
applies); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. I.C.C., 41 F.3d 721, 726–27 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(“[T]he inquiry at the second step of Chevron overlaps analytically with a court’s task under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), . . . in determining whether agency action is arbitrary and
capricious (unreasonable).”); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (finding a court should consider the following to determine whether an agency’s
action is arbitrary and capricious: whether the agency used factors Congress did not intend for it
to consider, the agency completely failed to address an important part of the issue, the agency gave
an explanation that is contrary to the evidence, or the action “is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise”); Pierce, supra note 8, § 3.6, at
173–74 (stating many circuit courts of appeals apply the State Farm reasonableness standard for the
second step).
158
526 F.3d 591, 602–11 (9th Cir. 2008); see Am. Bar Ass’n, Developments in Administrative
Law and Regulatory Practice 2007–2008, at 94–96 (Jeffery S. Lubbers ed., 2009) (discussing the
confusion that exists between step two of the Chevron doctrine and arbitrary and capricious review
in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. E.P.A.).
159

Natural Res. Def. Council, 526 F.3d at 593–94.

160

Id. 605–07.

161

Id. at 606.

162

Id. at 608–09 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
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step of Chevron.163 This split decision shows the confusion that exists among lower
courts with step two of the Chevron doctrine and the “arbitrary and capricious”
review standard.164
Instead of clarifying step two, the Court should eliminate the two-step process
and consolidate it into one single inquiry: “whether the agency’s construction is
permissible as a matter of statutory interpretation.”165 As previously stated, the
Supreme Court and lower courts persistently apply differing standards for each
step of the Chevron analysis.166 Judicial economy requires the different courts to
utilize the same standard; otherwise, courts may reach differing results on the same
issue.167 The single-step inquiry provides the framework for courts to maintain
flexibility while ensuring a standard all courts will apply consistently.168
Furthermore, all of the underlying purposes behind the Chevron doctrine—
agency expertise, political accountability, and congressional intent—remain
with the single-step inquiry.169 For example, in Entergy Corp., the Court
further advanced the purpose of political accountability by granting deference
to the EPA’s interpretation of § 316(b) of the CWA.170 Under the one-step
analysis, administrative agencies may still be held politically accountable for
their controversial decisions and retain the flexibility to alter their regulatory
decisions.171 Thus, while the use of cost-benefit analysis by administrative agencies
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See id. at 605–09; supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the underlying purposes
behind the Chevron doctrine).
169

See Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Clean Water Act: Judicial Review of Cost-Benefit Analysis,
123 Harv. L. Rev. 342, 351 (2009).
170

See id.; Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 1, at 608–09; Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference
to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 517–18 (1989) (noting one advantage
of the Chevron doctrine is an agency’s ability to change its decision compared to static judicial
precedent on statutory interpretation and another advantage is an agency experiences political
accountability through pressure by the Executive, Congress and its constituencies to interpret a
statute “correctly”).
171

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2010

19

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 10 [2010], No. 2, Art. 8

556	Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 10

remains controversial, the EPA may be held politically accountable and alter its
decision to use a cost-benefit analysis in the regulation of § 316(b) of the CWA
under the single-step inquiry.172

Conclusion
In Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held
the EPA’s use of a cost-benefit analysis in setting standards for § 316(b) of the
CWA permissible.173 In reaching its decision, the Court employed the two-step
Chevron doctrine.174 However, the Court, in effect, blurred the line between the
two steps to the point where the steps encompass only one question: “whether the
agency’s construction is permissible as a matter of statutory interpretation.”175 This
decision stands as a clear example of the need to collapse the two-step framework
into one single step.176 As Justice Scalia stated, “But surely if Congress has directly
spoken to an issue then any agency interpretation contradicting what Congress
has said would be unreasonable.”177
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